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I.

INTRODUCTION

Early attempts at commercial sign control were pursued under a theory
of public nuisance.' These rather piecemeal city efforts became streamlined in 1926, when the United States Supreme Court held that local governments could constitutionally regulate the use of private property by
means of comprehensive zoning ordinances.2 The governmental authority
to enact these restrictions on land use, like the public nuisance laws before
them, was deemed by the Court to flow from a state's police powers.3

I. See, e.g., St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929,
938 (Mo. 1911) (billboards allegedly served as "hide-outs" for criminals and shielded immoral acts); City of Passiac v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 62 A.
267, 268 (N.J. 1905) (city claimed that severe storms and natural decay caused billboards to
become threat to public safety); Cain v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 204, 206-07, 287 S.W. 262,
263-64 (1926) (unsuccessful attempt to uphold validity of city ordinance excluding signs
from certain areas by proving billboards were public nuisance).
2. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-95 (1926).
3. See id at 387-88 (by analogy, law of nuisance aids courts in determining permissible
range of police power action); see also City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144 S.W.2d 388, 398
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In the ensuing years, billboard regulations as to size, height, construction, maintenance, and placement were almost routinely sustained by
courts throughout the country.4 This near national phenomenon resulted
in large part from the presumption of validity which attaches to all legislative acts, consequently prompting great judicial deference upon review.5
Further, the respect which the judiciary accords these enactments has in
turn led the courts to broadly construe the permissible range of police
power objectives. 6 This essentially progressive view of a state's police
powers has recently caused more and more courts to conclude, contrary to
prior decisions, that aesthetics alone is a sufficient justification for billboard control.7 In so holding, a major limitation on the power of local

(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (scope of police power extends
beyond nuisance regulation to include comprehensive zoning ordinances).
4. See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 273-74
(1919) (height and area limitations on billboards approved); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison
Heights, 199 N.W.2d 525, 528-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (restrictions on height and size of
billboards upheld); State v. Wong Hing, 222 N.W. 639, 640-41 (Minn. 1929) (city ordinance
regulating height and construction of electric signs validated).
5. See, e.g., Royal Crest, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 520 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (courts cannot review city action unless proved to
be abuse of discretion); Westworth Village v. Mitchell, 414 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1967, no writ) (challenger of ordinance must establish by conclusive evidence
that restriction "bore no substantial relation to the health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the community and was thus arbitrary or unreasonable"); Frost v. Village of Hilshire
Village, 403 S.W.2d 836, 841-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no writ) (courts will not
interfere, unless challenger conclusively proves facts making city's refusal to rezone unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious). Some of the reasons why courts generally defer to local
judgment as to the necessity of certain land-use restrictions include: the separation of powers doctrine; the judiciary's lack of any specialized knowledge in the land-use area; and the
courts' desire to afford local governments a maximum degree of flexibility in responding to
changed conditions within the community. See Kolis, Citadels of Privilege." Exclusionary
Land Use Regulations And The Presumption of Constitutional Validity, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 585, 588-89 (1981). But see State v. Lotze, 593 P.2d 811, 813 (Wash. 1979) (when police
power regulation challenged on free speech grounds it is presumed unconstitutional infringement on first amendment rights), appeal dism'd, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); cf. Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (any statutory regulation of first amendment rights presumed unconstitutional).
6. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) (court refused
to "trespass" on local judgment that prohibition on truck panel advertising reasonably promotes traffic safety without evidence showing that judgment "to be palpably false").
7. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) ("billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed can be perceived an
'esthetic harm' ") and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (term "public welfare" is
broad in scope, encompassing physical, spiritual, economic, and aesthetic values, thus aesthetics is proper police power objective) and State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 429 P.2d 825,
827 (Hawaii 1967) (aesthetics alone is sufficient basis for exercise of police power)
with Varney & Green v. Williams, 100 P. 867, 868 (Cal. 1909) (aesthetics alone not enough to
justify city-wide billboard prohibition) and City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver-
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government to validly restrict signs, pursuant to their police power, has
been eliminated.'
Despite the courts' generally expansive attitude toward the police power
concept, these powers, which are frequently delegated by the state to the
local government to facilitate city planning, are not unlimited.9 They are
subordinate to the constitutional and statutory provisions of both the federal and the state governments.' °
tising & Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905) ("Aesthetic considerations...
of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity,. . . necessity alone ...

matter

justifies the exer-

cise of the police power"). See generally De Maria v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
271 A.2d 105, 108-09 (Conn. 1970) (ordinance which failed to specify particularized aesthetic aims found to be insufficient basis for exercise of police power); Williams, Subjectivity,
Expression, and Privacy.- Problems a/Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1977)
(judicial acceptance of aesthetics as basis for police power regulation of architecture implicates first amendment content suppression and vagueness problems).
8. See C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 19.18, at 465
(1980).
9. See, e.g., Tysco Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 12 F. Supp. 202, 203 (S.D. Tex. 1935)
(state may delegate police power to city); Cain v. State, 105 Tex. Crim. 204, 206, 287 S.W.
262, 263 (1926) (where manner of exercising police powers detailed or direct, state action has
foreclosed any local option; extent of city's authority to regulate limited by express terms of
enabling act); City of Coleman v. Rhone, 222 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1949, writ ref'd) (since police power inherent in state sovereignty, municipality's authority to
regulate pursuant to police power limited by state's grant); see also White v. City of Dallas,
517 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (home-rule cities' police powers
limited by state legislative enactments); Swain v. Board of Adjustment, 433 S.W.2d 727, 735
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ refd n.r.e.) ("public service business" exception in article
101 Ic restricts Texas home-rule cities' general authority to zone), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 277
(1970) (per curiam); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011 c (Vernon 1963) (limitations imposed on Texas home-rule cities' zoning power); cf. City of San Angelo v. Sitas, 143 Tex.
154, 159-60, 183 S.W.2d 417, 419-20 (1944) (Texas home-rule city, empowered by state statute to "control" sign placement and to define and prohibit nuisances, is thus authorized to
classify signs maintained contrary to city ordinance provisions as "nuisances"); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. .1015(11) (Vernon 1963) (local governing body given authority "to define and declare what shall be nuisances. . . and to abate all nuisances" deemed detrimental to "public health or comfort"). See generaly TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011
(Vernon 1963) (general grant of police powers to local governing body); id. art. 101 Ia (grant
of power for zoning); id art. 1175(19) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (home-rule cities given
power to define and prohibit nuisances within their boundaries); id. art. 1175(24) (Vernon
1963) (authority to regulate billboards legislatively conferred upon home-rule cities); id. art.
1175(34) (home-rule cities granted police powers). A city, endowed by its charter with the
power to enact ordinances in furtherance of the public health, safety and welfare, is expressly authorized to regulate bill posting, and the size, placement, and construction of billboards and may constitutionally regulate the location and maintenance of billboards. It
may not, however, create without an express legislative grant the office of bill poster, nor
may it assign to him the right to post all advertisements. See Ex parte Savage, 63 Tex. Crim.
285, 295-97, 141 S.W. 244, 250-51 (1911).

10. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633-34
(1973) (municipal aircraft noise control ordinance held invalid in face of prior federal gov-
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Challengers questioning the constitutional validity of local sign ordinances have traditionally focused on the property-interest aspect 'of billboards" rather than their expressive components because commercial
speech was only recently afforded a measure of first amendment protection
in Virginia State Boardof Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.. 12 In that case the United States Supreme Court found that the public's interest in the free flow of prescription drug pricing information outweighed the state's asserted interests in public health,' 3 and the
maintenance of high professional standards among its licensed pharmacists.14 As a result of this holding, a number of other state commercial
speech regulations began to be similarly attacked on first amendment
grounds.' 5
In spite of all this recent litigation,' 6 the Court's ad hoc balancing approach in the free speech area allows for few carryover generalizations

ernment legislation); National Food Stores, Inc. v. Cefalu, 280 So. 2d 903, 907-08 (La. 1973)
(ordinance enacted by municipality pursuant to its police power must conform to state's
statutes and constitution); Quaker Oats Co. v. City of New York, 68 N.E.2d 593, 595 (N.Y.
1946) (city ordinance invalid if "conflicts with the Federal law or infringes on its policy");
see also Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 356, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (1921) (ordinance
enacted pursuant to police power subject to fundamental liberties embodied in Bill of
Rights); City of Beaumont v. Bond, 546 S.W.2d 407, 409-11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (home-rule city empowered to enact any ordinance not inconsistent
with state or federal law).
11. Cf Note, The Media Win The Billboard Battle, But Metro Wins The War: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 493, 499 (1981) (first amendment
challenge to billboard regulations recent phenomenon).
12. 425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (commercial speech found not
"'wholly outside the protection of' the First Amendment").
13. See id at 767-70.
14. See id at 766-70; see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977) (advertising regarding availability and cost of routine services found not to undermine legal
professionalism).
15. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 532
(1980) (content-based regulation of utility bill inserts claimed to violate first amendment);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 356 (1977) (bar placed on attorney advertising attacked on
free speech grounds); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 86 (1977)
(ban on posting of real estate signs within township challenged on first amendment
grounds).
16. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512-13 (1981) (noncommercial billboard speech afforded higher constitutional protection than commercial billboard speech); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
569-72 (1980) (total ban on public utility's ads promoting consumer use of electricity overturned); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1979) (Texas statute which prevented optometrists from practicing under trade name upheld). See generally Riggs, The Burger Court
And Individual Rights. Commercial Speech As A Case Study, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957,
957-93 (1981) (survey of commercial speech decisions).
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concerning the precise protection afforded commercial billboard speech.' 7
Even the Court's recent discussion of "the law of billboards"' 8 in Metromedia, Inc v. City of San Diegoi 9 has given city planners little practical
guidance in formulating constitutionally valid sign ordinances.2 ° This
comment will thus separately explore the origins, nature, and development
of land use restrictions and general first amendment values. It will then
combine these two competing concepts in the context of billboard advertising in an attempt to provide a viable framework for drafting billboard
restrictions that are constitutionally harmonious with free speech
protection.
II.

LAND USE REGULATIONS

A. History and Development
The right to acquire, own, use, and dispose of property has always been
perceived as an innate right. 2' Despite this viewpoint, land ownership in
the United States is not considered to be a fundamental right which requires the strictest measure of constitutional protection; rather, it is re-

17. See A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 32 (1980) (United States Supreme Court's
"particularistic and pragmatic" balancing detrimental to development of coherent first
amendment approach).
18. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981).
19. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
20. See id at 569 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (describing Metromedia decision as "a
virtual Tower of Babel"); Young, Billboard Advertising Decision Is Indecisive, 67 A.B.A. J.
1350, 1350 (1981) (Metromedia decision termed indecisive). But see Crawford, Control of
Signs and Billboards After Metromedia,1982 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 129,
140 (F. Strom ed. 1982) (Metromedia, unlike other recent land-use decisions, provided more
answers than questions).
21. See Spann v. City of Dallas, Ill Tex. 350, 355, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15 (1921). Property, of which one cannot be dispossessed without due process of law, is more than actual
ownership of land or other tangible items. See id at 355, 235 S.W. at 514. The term "property" also encompasses acquired interests in the uninterrupted receipt of government benefits. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975) (property interest in public
education); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (continued receipt of welfare payments). These "new" property
interests are not acquired by unilateral expectation, rather an individual reliance upon entitlement must be legitimately induced by clear governmental policy statements. See Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (property interests protected by fourteenth
amendment's due process clause originate from and are defined by constitutionally independent sources, such as state laws); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601
(1972) (state university professor's property interest in continued employment may be evidenced by tenure provision in written employment contract); Stone v. Kendall, 268 S.W.
759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, no writ) (property right secured by Texas Constitution's "due process of law" clause, section 19 of article 1, subordinate only to police power).
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garded as a property interest subject to reasonable limitation.22
Accordingly, a landowner's use of his property must not be harmful to
others.23
At common law, when a particular land use was found to interfere substantially with the use or enjoyment of another's private property, it was
held to be a civil wrong, and the law of private nuisance was applied.24
Alternatively, when an owner's conduct on his land was found to affect
detrimentally an interest of the crown or one common tb the general populace, it was a criminal offense governed by public nuisance law. 25 It was
this public nuisance concept which formed the basis of local governments'
initial attempts to regulate private land usage. 26 Their success, however,
was often stymied by courts, which, in their reluctance to order the abatement of a property use which was not a nuisance per se, 2 7 frequently ques-

22. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (land ownership not absolute dominion); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799, 815
(Mass. 1935) (constitutional right to own land and determine its use exists; but this individual right may be regulated for common good).
23. See, e.g., Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 356, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (1921) (one's
use of property must not cause others harm); Rogers v. Scaling, 298 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (right to use and enjoy own land exists in law,
but that usage must not injure others); Iford v. Nickel, 1 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1928, no writ) (citizen has right to use own property as he wishes provided such
use does not impair corresponding rights of neighboring property owners).
24. See Rogers v. Scaling, 298 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (size and location of on-premise sign on common party wall constituted unreasonable interference with neighbor's commercial rent property).
25. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. South Covington & Cinn. St. Ry., 205 S.W. 581, 583
(Ky. Ct. App. 1918) (concept of "common nuisance" defined); Cain v. State, 105 Tex. Crim.
204, 207, 287 S.W. 262, 263-64 (1926) (ordinance excluding signs from certain areas of city
on common nuisance theory found invalid); Stone v. Kendall, 268 S.W. 759, 761 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1925, no writ) (city ordinance which sought to prohibit gravel pit operation
within city limits on theory of public nuisance invalidated since no probable harm to public
was found); see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 573 n. 16 (4th
ed. 1971). "Public nuisances may be considered as offenses against the public by either
doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of all the King's subjects, or by neglecting to do
a thing which the common good requires." Id (quoting RUSSELL, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1691 (8th ed. 1923)).
26. See, e.g., Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 494-95 (1916)
(dense smoke emanating from factory declared nuisance); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 408-14 (1915) (operation of brickyard curtailed because injurious to public health);
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 178-80 (1915) (livery stable deemed nuisance
to public health was banned).
27. See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 140-41 (1894) (destruction and removal of
illegally set fishing nets approved but court reluctant to allow items of greater value to be
summarily abated by state as nuisances); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 505
(1870) (city council nuisance denomination not conclusive; courts must determine what constitutes public nuisance); Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 314-16, 247 S.W. 810,
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tioned the municipality's authority to define such activities as nuisances in
fact.2 8
In marked contrast to these earlier rulings, the United States Supreme
Court, in 1926, gave general approval to a comprehensive zoning ordinance enacted by the Village Council of Euclid pursuant to the municipality's police power.2 9 In reaching its decision the Court first announced that
the authority of a municipality to zone, if it existed at all, must stem from
its police powers.3" Next, the Court balanced the landowner's right to continue using his property for its most profitable purpose against the public's
interest in homes situated apart from business and industrial buildings.3
The Court reasoned that limitations on private land use options, such as
those advanced in Euclid's comprehensive plan, were warranted by the
early twentieth century influx of people into the industrial urban centers
and the resulting complexities of congested city life. 2 This analysis led the
Court to conclude that: (1) the village had the authority to affirmatively
determine how private property may be used irrespective of nuisance and
without landowner compensation; 33 (2) this authority stemmed from its
812 (1923) (city ordinance characterizing all dilapidated buildings as "nuisances" and authorizing their removal did not render buildings nuisances in fact). The burden rested on
the city in Crossman to plead and prove that a building erected prior to the ordinance's
enactment was harmful to the public's safety or welfare. See id. at 315, 247 S.W. at 815.
28. See Stockwell v. State, 110 Tex. 550, 556, 221 S.W. 932, 934-35 (1921) (state legislature could not properly delegate to agricultural commissioner power to determine whether
diseased fruit trees not statutorily defined as "public nuisances" were nuisances in fact).
29. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-89 (1926). The
Court noted that the adoption of this particular comprehensive zoning plan was the product
of much careful research into the desirability of excluding commercial buildings from residential districts. See id at 393-94.
30. See id at 387; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887) (legislature
has power to determine what action appropriate or necessary to promote general welfare);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) ("under these [police] powers the government regulates the conduct of its citizens ... , and the manner in which each shall use his own property"); Stone v. Kendall, 268 S.W. 759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, no writ) (police
power grant of authority from people to their elected representatives for purpose of protecting public health, safety, comfort, and welfare).
31. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384-85, 389-95 (1926).
32. See id at 386-88, 392-94; see also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (building
set-back requirements necessitated by recent influx of people into city); F. ALLEN, ONLY
YESTERDAY 5 (Perennial Library ed. 1964) (housing shortage in 1919 caused Americans to
vilify landlord); S. LEwis, BABBITT 151 (Signet Classic ed. 1950) (in 1920, population of at
least 68 cities in United States exceeded 100,000). In his fictional portrayal of American life,
originally published in 1922, Lewis's title character describes New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia as "three cities, which are notoriously so overgrown that no decent white man,
nobody who loves his wife and kiddies and God's good out-o'-doors and likes to shake the
" Id. at 149.
hand of his neighbor in greeting, would want to live in them ..
33. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-90 (1926). The challenger in Euclid owned a commercial lot which was subsequently zoned residential. As an
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police power; 34 and, (3) the enactment of these zoning restrictions was in
reasonable furtherance of the general welfare and therefore a valid police
power exercise.35
In cases decided since Euclid, local governments' general authority to
regulate land usage pursuant to its police power has not been at issue. 36
Certain provisions of validly enacted ordinances, however, have been
found to be unconstitutional either on their face 37 or in their application to
a particular set of circumstances. 8

unrestricted commercial lot the value of the land was $150 per front foot; after it was zoned
exclusively for residential use, the land was worth at best $50 per front foot. See id. at 384.
This loss in value was not compensible, however, because the regulation of land use pursuant to the police power is not considered to be a deprivation of property without due process
of law. See id at 386-87. The fifth amendment states that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of. . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (fifth amendment made applicable to
states through adoption of fourteenth amendment); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876)
(fifth amendment due process clause applicable to state action after passage of fourteenth
amendment). While both the power of eminent domain and the police power are premised
on the principle that private rights are subordinate to the general welfare, eminent domain
usually involves a transfer of title to the federal government; by contrast, the police power
merely regulates land use with actual land ownership remaining in private hands. See C.
RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 19.4, at 449-50 (1980); see also
Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Ammons, 215 S.W.2d 407, 410-11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (police power subject to stricter limitations than eminent domain due
to lack of landowner compensation). All private property is held subject to the government's
right of eminent domain. See United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903); see also
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) ("taking" of
private property for public use is within meaning of fifth amendment; therefore, property
owner must be justly compensated for his loss); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518
(1883) (fifth amendment's "just compensation" provision limits government's sovereign right
of eminent domain).
34. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); ef. J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 437 n.2 (1978) (since only
delegated powers granted to United States Congress, national government possesses police
powers only within jurisdictional limits of federal property, such as District of Columbia).
35. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391-95. (1926).
36. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-98 (1962) (effective suspension of 30 year sand and gravel business found not to be unreasonable exercise of police
power). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 442-43 (1978) (since Euclid, extreme deference accorded to zoning power).
37. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (zoning ordinance
which prohibited all live entertainment in city's commercial district found to be impermissible regulation of speech in violation of first amendment).
38. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-06 (1977) (zoning ordinance
restricting number of related individuals in one household found to be invalid as applied to
particular family); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (zoning classifica-
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The Presumption of Validity and the Standardsof Review

The validity of a particular land use restriction is usually challenged on
both due process39 and equal protection grounds. 4° As the ordinance is a
legislative act, it is presumed to be proper, 4' unless it is found to affect
adversely a suspect class 42 or to impinge upon a fundamental right. 43

tion determined to be unreasonable as applied to challenger's land after review conducted of
individualized circumstances).
39. See City of Austin v. Nelson, 45 S.W.2d 692, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931,
no writ) (due process is met if police power exercised in furtherance of legitimate purpose
within its scope).
40. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). The Court in McLaughlin
stated that "Ij]udicial inquiry under Equal Protection Clause,. . . does not end with a showing of equal application among members of the class ....
The court must ... [also] determine . . . whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose." Id at 191; see also Thomas Cusak Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529-30
(1917) (distinctions in classifying billboards apart from buildings and fences reasonable in
interest of health and safety).
41. See Barrington v. Cokinos, 161 Tex. 136, 147, 338 S.W.2d 133, 141 (1960) (power to
initially determine whether ordinance necessary to promote public welfare resides in lawmaking body); cf. Trewitt v. City of Dallas, 242 S.W. 1073, 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1922, writ dism'd) (recital in preamble of legislation sufficient to establish necessity for ordinance creating plumbers' licensing board).
42. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("Equal Protection Clause demands
that racial classifications. . . be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny' ") (quoting Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-70 (1886)
(alienage a suspect class). Fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection challenges directed at state regulations which affect a suspect class or a fundamental right are
strictly scrutinized by the Court. In such a case, the government has the burden of proving
that their classification scheme is necessary to promote a compelling state interest and that
there is no less restrictive alternative. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (racial classification must
be "necessary and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy."); cf.Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1955). Where no fundamental
right or suspect class is involved, the Court will use a rational basis analysis when presented
with a fourteenth amendment challenge. This is a more deferential standard of review,
wherein the regulation is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the challenger to
demonstrate that the restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest rendering it arbitrary and capricious and thus unconstitutional. See id at 489-91.
43. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (woman's right to abortion held
"fundamental", but not unqualified right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (right of marital privacy recognized as fundamental); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561-62 (1964) ("right of sufferage... fundamental matter in a free and democractic society
.. . [thus] any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized"). In determining which rights are fundamental, the Court looks to
the "traditions and conscience of our people." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)); see alsoSan Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)
(fundamental right is right either implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by Constitution).
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Therefore, the burden is on the person attacking the regulation to establish
that the restriction as it affects his property is unreasonable and arbitrary."
A challenger must conclusively prove that, at the time such regulation was
enacted, 45 no facts tending to support the action of the local government
existed.46 The court then determines whether the challenger has presented
sufficient evidence 47 to show no reasonable basis for the ordinance could
have existed at the time of enactment.4 8
C. PermissiblePolice Power Purposes
The police power by definition encompasses all governmental action in
furtherance of the common good.49 As the public welfare is not a static
concept, these powers to legislate in the public interest are necessarily

44. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Trombetta v. Mayor
of Atlantic City, 436 A.2d 1349, 1360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981) (all police power
legislation limited by fourteenth amendment requirement that regulation not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious; and means selected must have real and substantial relation to
identified objectives).
45. See City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144 S.W.2d 388, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (court looks at conditions as they existed on date of
adoption when determining reasonableness of ordinance).
46. See Bernard v. City of Bedford, 593 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1980, no writ) (burden on challenger to show no issuable facts justifying the city's exercise of
discretion); Swain v. Board of Adjustment, 433 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1968, no writ). The court in Swain held that "[i]f the evidence before the court, as a whole, is
such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion that the board must have
reached in order to justify its action, then the order must be sustained." See id at 730; cf.
Connor v. City of Univ. Park, 142 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1940, writ
dism'd) (police power must be construed broadly due to complexity of urban life).
47. See City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 154 Tex. 206, 212-13, 275 S.W.2d 477, 481
(1955) (where law, not facts, at issue, court must look to sufficiency of challenger's complaint); Albert v. City of Addison, 561 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas) (court must
determine if challenger is entitled to prevail as "a matter of law"), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 566 S.W.2d 298 (1978).
48. See, e.g., City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 778-79 (Tex. 1972) (challenger must present conclusive evidence that ordinance is arbitrary enactment), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 901 (1973); City of Houston v. Johnny Frank's Auto Parts, 480 S.W.2d 774,
779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (challenger must show
ordinance is wholly unreasonable); City of Dallas v. Meserole Bros., 164 S.W.2d 564, 569
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942, writ ref d) (ordinance's challenger must prove no rational
relationship between ordinance and permissible police power purpose existed at time of
enactment).
49. See Spann v. City of Dallas, I11 Tex. 350, 355, 235 S.W. 513, 515 (1921) (police
power is grant of authority from people to their agents to secure general welfare). Through
use of its police powers a "government regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards
another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation
becomes necessary for the public good." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876).
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broad in scope.
While land use restrictions advancing the public health, safety, or
morals have historically been upheld as valid exercises of the police
power, 51 courts were at first reluctant to expand the concept of "general
welfare" beyond these three traditional goals.5 2 Gradually, however, they
were persuaded to acknowledge that economic and aesthetic concerns were
also important public interests.5 3 Despite this judicial notice, land use restrictions based solely on aesthetic concerns
have only recently gained the
54
approval of a majority of the courts.

50. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132-34 (1876) (elastic nature of police power to
accommodate changed conditions); City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144 S.W.2d 388, 399
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ dism'd judgmt cor.) (zoning power is prospective
power; allows for future planning). But see Spann v. City of Dallas, Ill Tex. 350, 357, 235
S.W. 513, 515 (1921) (exercise of police power only justified by public necessity).
51. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,7-10 (1974) (ordinance which
limited number of unrelated people who could live in one household found to affect no
fundamental right of association; thus regulation presumed valid); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (judiciary's role in reviewing legislative exercise of police power very
limited); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (building set-back restrictions upheld as
not clearly unreasonable).
52. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 15.82, at 756-57 (2d ed. 1976);
see also Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909) (regulation limiting building height could
not be sustained on aesthetic grounds alone); City of Texarkana v. Mabry, 94 S.W.2d 871,
874-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ dism'd) (ordinance, justified solely by aesthetics, which prohibited erection of gas stations held invalid).
53. See Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder. A New Majority of JurisdictionsAuthorize Aesthetic Regulation,48 UMKC L. REV. 125, 131-44 (1980) (listing of states which
accept aesthetics alone as legitimate basis for police power action). But see, e.g., Spann v.
City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 358, 235 S.W. 513, 516-17 (1921) (not Texas law "that a man
may be deprived of the lawful use of his property because his tastes. . . not in accord with
those of his neighbors"); Niday v. City of Bellaire, 251 S.W.2d 747, 750-51 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1952, writ ref d n.r.e.) (aesthetics alone insufficient basis for exercise of police
power); City of Texarkana v. Mabry, 94 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936,
writ dism'd) (denial of permit to erect gas station found to be invalid where city's action
motivated solely by aesthetic concerns).
54. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (aesthetics alone recognized as substantial governmental interest); Housing & Redev. Auth. v.
Schapiro, 210 N.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Minn. 1973) (slum clearance valid exercise of police
power even though condemned housing not health hazard); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 225 N.E.2d
749, 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1967) (aesthetics alone sufficient to sustain exercise
of police power). The courts' general reluctance to recognize aesthetics alone as a permissible police power objective stems in part from the subjective nature of aesthetics: first, in
terms of what is beauty; and then, in determining at what price beauty. See Note, City-Wide
Prohibition of Billboards.- Police Power and the Freedom of Speech, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1597,
1602 (1979); cf. Crossman v. City of Galveston, 112 Tex. 303, 310, 247 S.W. 810, 812 (1923)
(unsightliness alone does not make building nuisance).
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FIRST AMENDMENT

A. In General

The free interchange of ideas, envisioned by the absolutist language of
the first amendment,5 5 lies at the core of western democratic theory. 6
This first amendment guarantee was initially enacted in order to shield the
expression of unfavorable political opinions from federal government interference.5 7 With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868,58
state action was likewise limited in accordance with free speech values. 59

55. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .. ."Id; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36, 66 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (freedom of speech absolute if pure speech,
except when pure speech in form of libel, obscenity, or "fighting words").
56. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (free speech described as
"the matrix, the indispensible condition, of nearly every other form of freedom"); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (freedom of speech is
end in itself, safety valve for frustration, and means for finding truth through competition of
ideas); Abrams v. United States, 205 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("marketplace of ideas" reveals the truth); see also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF

EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) (discussion of free speech functions in democratic society).
57. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248-51 (1833) (first amendment rights only protected against federal government encroachment); cf.New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964) (Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 which gave federal
government authority to censor public criticism of officials' conduct, first focused nation's
attention on free speech, amendment's core concept of content neutrality). It is this doctrine
of content neutrality which forms the basis of all first amendment review. See Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (government regulations should not produce
"chilling" or "freezing" effects on free expression); see also BeVier, The FirstAmendment and
PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry Into The Substance and Limits of Princile, 30 STAN. L. REV.
299, 302 (1978) (doctrine of content neutrality which protects political speech "is derived
from the constitutional structure of democratic government"); cf Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems,47 IND. L.J. 1, 27-31 (1971) (first amendment protection should be limited to political speech).
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id
59. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) ("It has been determined that
the conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech."); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1927) (state law
which abridged first amendment speech rights in violation of fourteenth amendment's due
process clause held invalid); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (first amendment free speech rights presumed applicable to states through fourteenth amendment's due
process clause). Later decisions have similarly made the other rights, shielded from federal
government abridgement by the first amendment, safe from state action by incorporating
these rights into the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (freedom of religion);. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 365 (1937) (right of peaceful assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931)
(freedom of the press).
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As the scope of the first amendment review has been expanded to embrace
state, as well as federal regulation of speech, the topics of protected speech
have similarly been extended beyond the subject of political debate.6"

Further, first amendment speech principles have been applied to various
mediums of expression, apart from the spoken word. 6 '
Despite its express language, evolution, expansion, and importance in a
democratic society, the first amendment guarantee of freedom of expression is not an absolute.62 Only a substantial governmental interest, however, will justify placing restraints on protected speech. 63 This
requirement of substantiality is in accordance with the first amendment's
primary concern that government should not be able to dictate which topics are suitable for public discussion. 64 Consequently, any governmental

60. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (commercial speech granted first amendment protection).
61. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (billboards);
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66-67 (1981) (live nude dancing); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam) (contribution of money is speech); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (live drama); Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969) (picketing as expressive conduct); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (black armbands deemed
form of expression); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures are protected speech); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1949) (soundtracks); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (distribution of handbills); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941) (parades).
62. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509-17 (1951) (clear and present danger
may require infringement on first amendment speech guarantee); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949) (function of free speech in democracy is to challenge and provoke,
thus absent clear and present danger it is protected from censorship).
63. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (traffic
safety and aesthetics substantial state interests) and Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977) (furtherance of racially integrated communities found to
be "important governmental objective") with Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
701-02 (1977) (fear of legitimizing pre-marital sex held not to be substantial interest) and
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (clean streets not sufficient governmental
interest to justify anti-leafletting ordinance).
64. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (primary meaning of first
amendment is "that government has no power to restrict expression because of its content");
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (purpose of first amendment is
"to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail"); cf.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (doctrine of content neutrality provides opportunity for vigorous political debate). But cf. Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
209-10 (1975) (substantial invasion of privacy must be established by captive audience
before government may constitutionally prohibit offensive speech); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 507-08 (1951) (clear and present danger will justify government's suppression
of speech on basis of content); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (government censorship of ideas permitted in emergency).
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regulation of expression is presumed to be unconstitutional.6 5
When a free speech violation is claimed, the court first determines
whether the particular expression involved is "speech" within the meaning
of the first amendment.6 6 If protected speech is implicated, the court will
then evaluate the strength of the asserted governmental interest, 67 balancing the necessity justifying the restriction against the first amendment
right.6 8 A determination will also be made as to whether this is a direct
7°
69
regulation of content, or merely a time, place, or manner restriction;
and, whether the goal sought to be achieved 71through regulation could be
accomplished by some less restrictive means.

65. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-70 (1976); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939). "Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions." Id. at 161. Contra Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558
(1975) (prior restraint on speech not unconstitutional per se).
66. Compare Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (commercial speech not wholly outside first amendment)
with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957) (obscenity afforded no first amendment protection) and New Jersey v. Finance Am. Corp., 440 A.2d 28, 31-32 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1981) (phone calls made with intent to harass enjoy no first amendment
protection).
67. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (state's asserted interest in controlling "practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty" found not compelling).
68. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977) (quoting
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)) ("[r]egardless of the particular label" put upon
speech, when first amendment interests at stake Court must balance free speech interest
against asserted governmental interest).
69. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (content-based
restrictions have only been upheld "when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home"
and when in "captive audience" situation); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972)
(content-based restriction on picketing near school struck down); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940) (breach of peace conviction based on playing of recording of
religious tracts on public street invalid content-based restriction on free speech).
70. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (three-step test articulated for determining if ordinance which restricts speech in public place is reasonable
time, place, and manner regulation). In gauging the reasonableness of an asserted time,
place, and manner restriction, the court first determines if the speech activity being regulated
is compatible with the forum's customary use. The court then considers whether a legitimate
governmental interest justifying the regulation has been advanced, and whether the ordinance has been narrowly drawn to advance that interest. See id at 116-17; see also Heffron
v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-55 (1981) (restriction on location of solicitors at state fair upheld as valid place and manner regulation);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) (regulation of soundtracks' amplification upheld as
manner restriction).
71. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620,
633-34 (1980) (Court's task not only to assess substantiality of governmental interest asserted
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Evolution of the CommercialSpeech Doctrine

Purely commercial speech72 was initially considered to be outside the
scope of first amendment protection. 73 The United States Supreme
Court's position in Valentine v. Chrestensen,74 while not directly overruled
for more than thirty years, 75 became qualified by later decisions which
established protection for noncommercial speech elements arising in a
commercial setting. 76
These equivocations came to a halt in 1976, when the Court held that
but also to determine if less restrictive regulation possible); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-18 (1975) (least restrictive means essential when regulation affects
free speech); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (Equal Protection Clause demands "that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives").
72. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (commercial speech defined as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)) ("speech which does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction' "); Scanlon, Freedom of Expression And Categories of Expression, 40 U. PiTr. L. REV. 519, 540-41 (1979) (commercial speech is "expression by a participant in the market for the purpose of attracting buyers or sellers").
73. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (purely commercial
speech devoid of first amendment value) with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (commercial speech while
not equated with noncommercial speech is within first amendment protection); see alsoFirst
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (basis of commercial speech's first amendment protection is its informational value).
74. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The promotor in Chrestensen was convicted of distributing advertising leaflets in the streets, in contravention of a city sanitation ordinance. In upholding
his conviction, the Court distinguished between protected speech which the city could regulate but not prohibit, and purely commercial speech which could be totally prohibited. See
id at 54; cf. Redish, The First Amendment in The Marketplace: Commercial Speech and The
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971) (Chrestensen Court
"without citing precedent, historical evidence, or policy considerations, . . . effectively read
commercial speech out of the first amendment"). A political protest, which had been added
onto the reverse side of defendant's handbill, in an attempt to circumvent the ordinance, had
no effect on the Court's characterization of the leaflet as purely commercial speech, because
the "primary purpose" in making the political statement had been commercial. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (primary purpose test).
75. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 763, 773 (1976) (consumers held to have protected speech interest in prescription drug price advertising); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975)
(Chrestensen limited to its facts).
76. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (paid political ad in
newspaper not commercial advertisement in Chrestensen sense); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (movies made to distribute for profit protected speech);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-12 (1943) (sale of religious books incidental to
right of Jehovah's Witness to disseminate beliefs); cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
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truthful commercial speech 77 concerning lawful activities78 was not
outside the scope of first amendment protection.7 9 As with other protected
speech, the state retained its power to regulate the time, place, or manner
of commercial speech.8 ° Such restrictions, however, have to be neutral in
content, advance a significant governmental interest, and leave open other
avenues of communication."'
In Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,82 the Court continued

to employ the same analysis for evaluating a governmental restriction on
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) ("exchange of information is as
important in the commercial realm as in any other").
77. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771-73 (1976); see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (complete
prohibition of truthful newspaper advertising invalid). CompareNew York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-80 (1964) (higher standard of proof required for public official to
show libel due to "chilling effect" tending to damage political expression) with Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(false and misleading commercial speech excluded from all first amendment protection).
78. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975) (advertising protected activity); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973) (commercial speech promoting unlawful activity not protected).
79. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976). But see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 404-05 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (affording advertising free speech protection demeans first amendment); A.
Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 33 (1980) ("philosophical and political foundations of first
amendment doctrine scarcely extend to an offer to enter into a private commercial transaction"); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech.: Economic Due Processand the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979) (since commercial speech does not advance first
amendment values of "effective self-government" and "opportunity for self-fulfillment," Virginia Pharmacy wrongly decided). "[W]e have not held that [commercial speech] is undifferentiable from other [speech] forms. There are commonsense differences ..
" Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976); see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech occupies
"subordinate position in the scale of first amendment values").
80. Compare Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 647-55 (198 1) (place and manner restriction on commercial speech affirmed) and Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 79-84 (1976) (time, place, or manner restriction
upheld in commercial speech setting) with Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966)
(application of time, place, or manner test in noncommercial context) and Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (municipality's parade licensing provisions upheld
as time, place, and manner restriction on public's use of streets for religious rallies).
81. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
82. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). The ordinance in Linmarkprohibited the posting of "For Sale"
signs on front lawns in the township. The local government claimed this was merely a time,
place, or manner restriction. See id at 93-94. The Court, however, concluded that the regulation was content-based. Further, the Court determined that the township had failed to
establish that this ordinance was necessary to insure that Willingboro remained a racially
integrated community. See id. at 94-96.
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commercial speech that it had used in previous noncommercial speech
cases despite commercial speech's less favored status.8 3 Finally, the fear of
noncommercial speech dilution 84 forced the majority in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 85 to articulate a separate standard of review for commercial speech. 6 Conversely, two of the
concurring justices in Central Hudson were convinced that all protected
speech would be devalued if commercial speech became isolated from
noncommercial speech analysis.87
IV.

BILLBOARD REGULATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. Before Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
Evaluation of any billboard ordinance is complicated by the unique
properties of this form of expression.8 8 Billboards possess a dual nature,
83. Compare id at 95 (record did not establish ban on posting of "For Sale" signs was
necessary in attaining goal of racially integrated community) with Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (state must show compelling interest when it intrudes significantly upon fundamental liberty) and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
466 (1958) (Alabama failed to demonstrate disclosure of association's membership records
was necessary). The Court in Linmark seemingly suggests that commercial speech which is
not misleading or false would be entitled to the same measure of constitutional protection as
noncommercial speech. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97
(1977); see alsoRiggs, The Burger Court & Individual Rights: CommercialSpeech As A Case
Study, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957, 977 (1981).
84. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial
speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject
the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expresion.
Id at 456.
85. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
86. See id at 563-66. To be protected commercial speech, the speech "must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading." Id. at 566. Further, any regulation upon commercial speech content must be justified by a substantial governmental interest. See id at 566.
The regulation must directly advance the asserted governmental interest and be no more
extensive than necessary to achieve that interest. See id. at 566.
87. See id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring). "No differences between commercial
speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information." Id at 578
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1981) (billboards are structures which communicate ideas); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (Mass. 1935) (billboards in "class by
themselves"); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 93 A.2d 362, 365 (N.J. 1952)
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the medium and the message.89 The physical structure of the sign is not
such expression as is protected by the first amendment and therefore the
size, height, degree of illumination, and location of the billboard may be
reasonably regulated by the state acting pursuant to its police powers. 90
The sign's message, on the other hand, is speech and thus is protected from
government action by the first amendment. 9 ' Further, the precise degree
of first amendment protection which is afforded a particular message is a
function of the character of the speech involved.9 2 If the sign's message
concerns a political, cultural, social, or religious topic, maximum first
amendment protection is provided.9 3 If, however, the idea communicated
relates "solely to the economic interests" of the speaker and his audience, 94
the expression is deemed to be commercial and as such is accorded a lesser
measure of first amendment protection.9 5 Additionally, the degree of pro-

(billboard's unique nature and nuisance potential justify city's separate classification for regulatory purposes); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (each mode of
communication raises special first amendment inquiries); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (each mode of expression presents unique problems requiring first amendment assessment by standards particularly tailored to that mode of expression); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (medium chosen by speaker is
component of expression).
89. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981) (billboard is
structure whose function is to display messages). But see John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine, J., concurring) (practically speaking, billboards
have no purpose or meaning beyond their "potential for speech"), aft'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981).
90. See, e.g., Sign Supplies, Inc. v. McConn, 517 F. Supp. 778, 785 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(advertising sign's structure subject to reasonable regulation); Berg Agency v. Township of
Maplewood, 395 A.2d 261, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (size limitations, set-back
requirements, and provisions as to duration of display in municipal sign ordinance found
reasonable); Westfield Motor Sales v. Town of Westfield, 324 A.2d 113, 123-24 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1974) (ordinance regulating size of on-premise signs upheld).
91. See, e.g., John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 1980) (Pettine,
J., concurring) ("billboards are expression incarnate"), aff'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981); Williams
v. City of Denver, 622 P.2d 542, 546 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (billboard signs are mode of
communication); Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 4264 v. City of Steamboat Springs, 575
P.2d 835, 839 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) ("signs are by their very nature a means of expression"), appeal dismissed,439 U.S. 809 (1978).
92. See State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 828 (N.J. 1980) (restrictions on signs may distinguish between political and commercial speech).
93. Accord New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
.94. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (first amendment protection afforded commercial speech due to advertising's informational value); cf. Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977) (first amendment presumes that any accurate information is better than none at all); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) ("people will perceive their own best interests
if only they are well enough informed").
95. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech
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tection given a particular commercial speech message is dependent upon
strength of the governboth the nature of the expression 96 and the relative
97
mental interest which prompted its regulation.
Regardless of the degree of first amendment protection involved, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on billboard speech are permissible. 98 These ordinances, however, must be content-neutral, serve a
significant governmental interest, and leave open alternative avenues for
communication. 99 The power of the government to regulate signs on the
basis of their messages or subject matter is more circumscribed." °
Regulations based on the content of noncommercial messages must be
in direct furtherance of a compelling state interest with no less restrictive
means available. 10 Alternately, content-based restrictions on commercial
"subordinate" to noncommercial expression); New Jersey v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 826 n.5
(N.J. 1980) ("commonsense distinctions" between commercial and noncommercial speech
require different levels of constitutional protection).
96. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979) (misleading commercial
information may be prohibited); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978) (ban
on misleading advertising permissible); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (commercial message concerning illegal activity
afforded no first amendment protection). The first amendment, however, does not generally
permit content-based regulation. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980).
97. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980); see also John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1980) (statewide
ban of off-premise commercial highway signs advances related governmental interests of
aesthetics and tourism), ajf'd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981).
98. See State v. Lotze, 593 P.2d 811, 814 (Wash.) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S.
921 (1979).
99. See, e.g., Sign Supplies, Inc. v. McConn, 517 F. Supp. 778, 785 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(restrictions pertaining to time, place, and manner of sign advertising found acceptable if for
"valid purpose" and "if alternative channels of communication are left open"); Williams v.
City of Denver, 622 P.2d 542, 546 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (to protect citizen's privacy, city
may enact reasonable time, place, and manner regulations "irrespective of content"); New
Jersey v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 828-29 (N.J. 1980) (time, place, and manner restrictions must
further significant governmental interest and must be in accordance with existing zoning
ordinances).
100. See Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Berg Agency v. Township
of Maplewood, 395 A.2d 261, 266-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (content-based regulations of speech rarely upheld).
101. Accord Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507-08 (1951) (clear and present
danger required to uphold content-based regulations); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (restriction on first amendment must be necessary "to prevent
a grave and immediate danger to interests the State may lawfully protect"). Where no clear
and present danger exists, the state's asserted interest in regulating the content of noncommercial speech is rarely found to be compelling. See Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City
of Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (telephone numbers on billboard
which provided public with access to abortion information did not create imminent danger
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speech must meet the four-part test advanced in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission. 102
Commercial speech which promotes an illegal activity or which is misleading receives no first amendment protection under the CentralHudson
analysis. °3 Content-based restrictions on all other types of commercial
speech must directly further a substantial governmental interest while
reaching no farther than necessary to accomplish that purpose in order to
be upheld."° Finally, the presumption of validity that traditionally attaches to a local government's exercise of its police power carries little if
any weight where the regulation infringes on the rights of expression protected under the first amendment.' 0 5
Prior to 1981, the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed four

of illegal abortions); Farrell v. Township of Teaneck, 315 A.2d 424, 426-27 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1974) (aesthetics alone found not to be compelling reason to justify residential
prohibition on political signs). But see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 824, 838-40 (1976) (regulation which prohibited political speech on military post found consistent with content neutrality doctrine); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (ordinance
prohibiting display of campaign signs on city buses upheld on theory law advanced concept
of government content neutrality). Even where the state's interest is sufficiently strong, the
ordinance will fail if the regulation has not been closely tailored to advance the interest
asserted. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964)). "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964); see also Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (where state seeks to regulate speech on basis of content, least
drastic means of achieving asserted purpose must be used); cf State ex rel. Dep't of Transp.
v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337, 347 (Okla. 1979) (burden of persuasion on state to demonstrate ordinance narrowly drawn to advance compelling interest).
102. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). This test is similiar to the test which determines whether
a regulation of a particular course of conduct is constitutionally permissible. Compare
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("A goveriment regulation is sufficiently
justified .
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.") with Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (ordinance which regulates on basis of commercial speech
content must directly advance substantial governmental interest and be no more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest).
103. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 56364 (1980).
104. See id at 564.
105. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-15 (1975) (ordinance enacted
pursuant to police power loses presumption of validity when regulation based on content of
expression).
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decisions upholding legislation restricting billboard speech.' 0 6 It was not
until Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 107 however, that the Court
the problems posed by a police power regulation of billdirectly addressed
08
board speech.
B. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
In 1972, the City of San Diego enacted a sign ordinance whose stated
purposes were to eliminate traffic distractions and to promote the city's
appearance." ° By its terms, this provision set up a city-wide ban on all
outdoor advertising display signs' except those billboards which came
under the ordinance's two general exceptions: on-site signs,"' and signs
which fell within one of twelve particularized categories." 12 Outdoor advertising companies that owned signs in San Diego brought suit in California superior court to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance." 3
The trial court found that the ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and impermissibly infringed on rights protected by the first amendment.' ' 4 The California court of appeals
determined that the ordinance was outside the city's police powers and did
not discuss the first amendment issues." 5 The California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the enactment was proper and within the scope of
San Diego's police powers." 6 This court also rejected the billboard companies' first amendment claims in reliance on certain summary judgments

106. See Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440
U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Markham
Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316 (1969); cf. Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694

F.2d 1358, 1371 (5th Cir. 1983) (summary affirmance implies approval of result alone); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 1981) (summary disposition reaches only

precise issues presented).
107. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).

108. See id at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. See id
110. See id
Ill. See id
product, service

at 493 n.l.
at 494.
at 494. An on-site sign was defined as one which "directs attention to a
or activity, event, person, institution or business." Id at 494.

112. See id at 495 n.3. Signs exempted from the ordinance's off-premise ban included:
bus stop bench signs; government signs; campaign signs; historical society markers; "For
Sale" signs; and time, temperature and news signs. See id at 495 n.3.
113. See id at 497.
114. See id at 497.

115. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 460-61 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977), vacated andrev'd, 592 P.2d 728, 154 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. 1979) (en banc), rev'd,
610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (Cal. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
116. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 416, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510,

519 (Cal. 1980) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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handed down by the United States Supreme Court.1 17
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 1 8 thus represented the United
States Supreme Court's first occasion to address the constitutionality of a
municipal billboard regulation." 9 After determining that billboard speech
implicated certain free speech interests, the Court commented on the
unique standard of first amendment review required by each mode of expression.' 20 The plurality then characterized the ordinance as a regulation
and not a complete prohibition of billboard speech and proceeded to separately consider the effect of the regulation on both commercial and noncommercial speech.'21

The plurality, in their application of the Central Hudson test to their
commercial speech analysis, however, presumed traffic safety and aesthetics were reasonably related to San Diego's off-premise sign ban rather than
requiring the city to prove the relationship. 22 They also accepted without
question the city's choice to value commercial on-premise signs over commercial off-premise signs; finally, the Court concluded that the ordinance
was constitutional as to commercial speech. 2 3 The ordinance was deemed
24
unconstitutional, however, when applied to noncommercial speech.1
The plurality's holding was founded on two different grounds. 125 First,
the Court determined that by permitting signs which advertised the business conducted or the products sold on the premises, while prohibiting all
other signs, the city was impermissibly valuing commercial speech over
noncommercial messages.' 26 Similarly, the plurality also concluded that
San Diego in allowing the twelve noncommercial exceptions to its general
off-premise ban was in effect violating the principle of government content-neutrality by favoring certain kinds27of noncommercial messages over
other noncommercial communications.
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who concurred in the judgment, agreed
with the plurality that billboard speech was entitled to first amendment
protection. 28 They found, however, despite the exceptions, that the San

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1981).
453 U.S. 490 (1981).
See id. at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See id at 500-01.
See id at 503.
See id at 507-10.
See id at 512.
See id at 513-17.
See id at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
See id at 513.
See id at 514-17.
See id at 524 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
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Diego ordinance effectively banned billboards from the city. '2 9 Thus, they
advocated the use of a total ban analysis rather than the bifurcated approach employed by the plurality.130 Under this total ban approach, Justice Brennan suggested that a city ban on billboards might be upheld if the
city could show that a "sufficiently substantial governmental interest is directly furthered by the total ban, and that any more narrowly drawn restriction . . . would promote less well the achievement of that goal."''
He concluded, however, that San Diego had failed to present any evidence
regarding the relationship between its substantial interest in traffic safety
and the total ban,' 32 nor had the city demonstrated that the ordinance was
narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose.1 33 Further, the concurrence, unlike the plurality, failed to recognize that the city's asserted interest in aesthetics was sufficiently substantial without some showing by the city that it
was making a34concerted effort to improve the attractiveness of its urban
environment.
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, agreed with the plurality that the distinction between commercial on-premise and off-premise signs was constitutionally permissible.' 35 He, however, further announced that he would
allow a total prohibition on billboard speech if alternative means of communication remained open, if the regulation was not biased in favor of a
and if it did not attempt to manipulate the topics of
particular viewpoint,
136
debate.
public
Chief Justice Burger agreed with the plurality that aesthetics and traffic
safety are sufficiently substantial governmental interests to justify San Di-

129. See id at 522-26 (Brennan, J.,concurring in judgment); cf. Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) ("every regulation necessarily speaks as a
prohibition").
130. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment). Brennan stressed that the plurality's bifurcated approach in evaluating a billboard ordinance presents a danger to the principle of content neutrality as it
allows local officials a great deal of unsupervised discretion in determining what is and is not
commercial speech. See id at 536-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also id at
566 n.7 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131. See id at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
132. See id at 534 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Brennan declined to reach
the question of whether the exceptions to the total ban also constituted a basis for invalidating the ordinance. See id at 532 n. 10. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
133. See id.at 528-29 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
134. Compare id at 510 (plurality judicially recognizes substantiality of government's
asserted interest in aesthetics) with id at 530-33 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (Brennan and Blackmun would require government to demonstrate substantiality of aesthetic interest with comprehensive plan).
135. See id at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
136. See id.at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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ego's exercise of its police power.' 37 Burger, unlike the plurality, employed the rational basis test and thus effectively ignored all first
38
amendment interests.'
Justice Rehnquist also accepted the city's asserted interests in traffic
safety and aesthetics as legitimate bases for- San Diego's billboard ordinance. 139 Rehnquist further stated that aesthetics alone was a sufficient
ground for a city-wide ban on billboard speech.' 40
C. After Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
While the United States Supreme Court has directly addressed the constitutionality of a San Diego ordinance regulating billboards under the first
amendment,4 the practical application of this plurality opinion's principles to other cities' sign ordinances remains limited. 42 Metromedia, however, has prompted lower courts to analyze a billboard regulation's impact
on commercial speech apart from its effect on ideological speech. "4 Further, this decision has caused lower courts to consistently conclude that a
city-wide ordinance which permits on-site commercial signs but which
prohibits noncommercial signs is facially invalid.'4

137. See id at 560 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
138. See id at 560 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139. See id at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. See id at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141. See id at 498-501.
142. See Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1184 (D. Md.
1982) (lack of majority opinion and differences in sign ordinance provisions make blanket
application of Metromediadifficult). The United States Supreme Court was aware of the
problems presented to lower courts by their many opinions. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569-70 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (decision likened to
"Tower of Babel").
143. See R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 294 S.E.2d 388, 391 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982); Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 433 N.E.2d 198,
200-01 (Ohio 1982); cf. Maurice Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 427
N.E.2d 25, 28 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (billboard company whose signs only conveyed commercial messages did not have standing to address noncommercial interests affected by offpremise ban). With its bifurcated analysis the Metromedia Court is using message content to
distinguish between different levels of protected speech, in contrast to its previous first
amendment opinions where content was used to separate protected speech from unprotected
speech. See Note, "hat Happenedto the First Amendment. The Metromedia Case, 13 LoY.
U. CHI. L.J. 463, 480 (1982).
144. Accord Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379-81 (1977) (distinctions between relative value placed on commercial as opposed to noncommercial speech allows for greater
degree of regulation of commercial speech); see City of Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor
Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52, 58 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (sign ordinance which merely regulated
commercial speech while banning political speech found unconstitutional); Metromedia,
Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1186-87 (D. Md. 1982) (ordinance which
permits only signs identifying building's occupant unconstitutionally discriminates against

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol15/iss3/6

24

Swenson: A Sign of the Times: Billboard Regulation and the First Amendment

1984]

COMMENT

In contrast to this consensus of lower court opinion, the remainder of the
Metromedia decision has generated mixed results. Relying on certain language in Metromedia, some courts have determined that regulatory distinctions between on-site and off-site signs are classifications between signs
which are a part of a business, and signs which in and of themselves constitute a business.145 Viewed as discriminations between signs, this categorization is constitutionally permissible if reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. 146 Consequently, these regulations are generally
147
upheld as content-neutral place and manner restrictions on speech.
Alternately, since on-site and off-site signs are frequently defined in

noncommercial speech). But see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 56869 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (preferred position of ideological speech does not require
city to impose the same or greater restrictions on commercial speech as it has placed on
noncommercial expression); State ex rel. Spannus v. Hopf, 323 N.W.2d. 746, 755 (Minn.
1982) (regulation which prohibits off-premise signs from being located within 100 feet of
church or school permissible even though it may impact more heavily on noncommercial
speech); Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 433 N.E.2d 198,
203-04 (Ohio 1982) (Locher, J., dissenting) (on-site commercial advertising exception to general billboard prohibition not unconstitutional as government does not have to regulate to
full extent of its authority in commercial speech area just because it has done so in noncommercial context).
145. See Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormond Beach, 415 So. 2d
1312, 1316-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (practical distinctions exist between on-premise
signs and off-premise signs); State ex rel Spannus v. Hopf, 323 N.W.2d 746, 753-54 (Minn.
1982) (discrimination between signs which identify activity conducted on the premises and
signs which refer to activity conducted elsewhere permissible in recognition of unique
properties of on-site business signs).
146. See, e.g., Lamar-Orlando Outdoor Advertising v. City of Ormond Beach, 415 So.
2d 1312, 1316-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (classification is reasonable since on-site and offsite commercial signs are not "similarly circumstanced" and challenger has burden of proof
to show regulation is arbitrary and capricious); State ex rel.Spannus v. Hopf, 323 N.W.2d
746, 753 n. 11 (Minn. 1982) (legislative classification between on-premise and off-premise
signs upheld, even in first amendment challenge, if reasonably related to legitimate government purpose); R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 294 S.E.2d 388, 391 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982) (court found ordinance's classification scheme which permitted on-site commercial
signs but excluded off-site commercial signs to be reasonable distinction); accord Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) (ordinance which prohibited vehicles
from displaying advertising messages except information identifying owner's business was
presumed to be reasonably related to goal of traffic safety; challenger must demonstrate that
no rational basis for law exists to prevail).
147. Accord Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (time, place, and manner restriction must be justified without
reference to content, serve significant governmental interests, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)
(time, place, and manner restriction is an attempt to make free speech rights compatible with
particular forum's normal use); see also State ex rel Spannus v. Hopf, 323 N.W.2d 746, 754
(Minn. 1982); R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 294 S.E.2d 388, 391 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982).
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terms of the subject which each may convey, 14 8 other courts have found
these categories to be presumptively unconstitutional content-based restrictions on free speech.' 49 Of these courts, some view this division as a
discrimination between commercial and noncommercial messages and
strike down ordinances which prefer commercial over noncommercial
communication;' 5° while others read the on-site and off-site designations
as subcategories of commercial speech, and uphold the classification in
that limited context.' 5 ' Thus in order to avoid a possible content-based
challenge, local governments should avoid using the on-site and off-site
distinction when composing their billboard ordinances and should instead
limit their regulation
to the sign's physical attributes such as size, height,
52
and illumination.
The Metromedia decision has also produced a split in lower court opinions as to whether all billboard ordinances directly advance governmental
interests in traffic safety and aesthetics.' 53 Some courts, following Justice
White's opinion, have taken judicial notice of the substantial relationship
148. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (D.
Md. 1982) (defining on-premise sign as signs "identifying the property where they are installed or identifying the use conducted [thereon]") with State ex rel. Spannus v. Hopf, 323
N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn. 1982) (defining on-site sign as "[aln advertising device located on
the premises . . . of an individual, business or organization when the sale or lease of the
premises or the identification, products or services of the individual, business or organization are the subject of the advertising device").
149. See Taxpayers for Vincent v. Members of City Council, 682 F.2d 847, 849 (9th
Cir. 1982) (statute which regulates first amendment rights is presumptively unconstitutional
and state must show law bears "substantial relation" to a "weighty" governmental concern),
prob. juris noted,- U.S. __ 103 S. Ct. 1180, 75 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1983); City of Lakewood v.
Colfax UnLtd. Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52, 65 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (zoning ordinance which impinges on first amendment rights is presumed unconstitutional and city must advance substantial interest in order to justify regulation).
150. See Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md.
1982) cf. City of Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52, 58 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (sign ordinance which imposed virtual ban on political speech while merely regulating commercial speech found unconstitutional).
151. Accord Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (different
valuations placed on various categories of commercial speech subject to presumption of legislative validity and classifications drawn need only bear reasonable relationship to asserted
interest). While the Metromedia Court here seems to suggest that a city may regulate the
various subcategories within the general category of commercial speech and its judgment
will be presumed to be reasonable, at least one lower court has viewed such subcategorization as a content-based distinction subject to review under the CentralHudson test. See City
of Lakewood v. Colfax UnLtd. Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52, 68 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
152. See Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md.
1982) (size and appearance of signs may be constitutionally regulated without reference to
content).
153. Compare id at 1187 (court noted substantial relationship existed between billboard ban, and interests in traffic safety and aesthetics) with Norton Outdoor Advertising,
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between an asserted interest in traffic safety and aesthetics, and all billboard regulations. 5 4 Other courts, pursuant to Justice Brennan's concurrence, require the city to present evidence that concern for traffic safety
and/or aesthetics infact prompted the enactment of the challenged ordinance.155 Moreover, at least one court has expressed reluctance to accept
an asserted governmental interest in aesthetics alone as a substantial basis
for restricting commercial speech. 156 Local governments, therefore, should
not rely on a broad statement of purpose to provide the court with sufficient evidence that the provision directly furthers the interests asserted;
rather, they should be prepared to present evidence demonstrating the extent to which the ordinance serves those interests. Further, even though
aesthetics has been accepted as a valid basis for the exercise of the police
power, an ordinance which restricts billboard speech should avoid using
aesthetics alone as grounds for a particular enactment.
Finally, when presented with the possiblity that an off-premise commercial ban might be found constitutonal, some lower courts have questioned
in dicta whether the bifurcated approach employed by the plurality in Metromedia provides local governments with too great an opportunity to censor unpopular noncommercial speech merely by classifying the
communication as commercial in nature. These courts reason that although commercial speech is a lesser-valued form of communication, the
first amendment protection afforded noncommercial speech will not sanction a constitutional analysis which would permit local officials to first categorize, and then ban speech on the basis of that classification.

Inc. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 433 N.E. 2d 198, 201 (Ohio 1982) (relationship between
sign regulation and interests in aesthetics and traffic safety must be proved).
154. See Frumer v. Cheltenham Township, 709 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1983) (courts
defer to legislative judgment that goals of traffic safety and aesthetics are advanced by regulation unless ordinance appears facially unreasonable); Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (D. Md. 1982) (judicial notice taken of relationship between
billboard ban and city's concern with traffic safety and aesthetics).
155. See, e.g., Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982) (absent
evidence that city officials found portable signs unattractive, court would not accept "mere
incantation of aesthetics" as legitimate purpose), cert. denied, - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 1873, 76
L. Ed. 2d 806 (1983); Rhodes v. Gwinnett County, 557 F. Supp. 30, 32-33 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(no evidence offered to support claim that county's interest in aesthetics and traffic safety
prompted ordinance's enactment); Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 433 N.E. 2d 198, 201 (Ohio 1982) (if no proof offered, court will not speculate as to
relationship between sign ordinance and city's announced goals of traffic safety and
aesthetics).
156. See H & H Operations v. City of Peachtree City, 283 S.E.2d 867, 868-70 (Ga.
1981) (city ordinance which permitted signs identifying activity conducted and products
available on premises but which prohibited dissemination of product pricing information
found unconstitutional as numbers not aesthetically inferior to letters)
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CONCLUSION

Unlike a billboard, Metromedia's message remains unclear. Cities, however, can no longer ignore the first amendment interests involved in billboard regulation. Cases decided after Metromedia have demonstrated that
billboard ordinances should clearly set out the regulation's objective rather
than relying on an all-inclusive statement of purpose. Further, the objectives of the ordinance should be a recognized police power objective. In
addition, even though aesthetics alone has now been accepted in a majority of states as a permissible police power purpose, if aesthetics is the only
stated reason for the enactment, the city should be prepared to prove that
the ordinance is part of a comprehensive plan to improve theattractiveness
of the community.
Having thus established the substantiality of its interest, the city should
next be ready to present evidence demonstrating that it has designed its
ordinance so as to directly further that substantial interest. The definition
of "sign" in the ordinance should avoid distinctions between types of
speech, thus eliminating local discretionary decisions categorizing speech.
Finally, the regulation should not extend beyond the sign's physical attributes, thus avoiding the possibility of a content-based first amendment challenge. By following these guidelines, billboard restrictions can be drafted
which are compatible with basic first amendment principles.
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